The inherent tension between the interests of an employer and employee makes the relationship between them a challenging one to manage and ever open to conflict. Working under the rubric of agency theory, rational choice theorists have formally modeled this type of relationship, seeking to characterize the most efficient form of compensation contract to manage the tension (Salanie, 2002) . Agency theory has subsequently been used to examine accountability in hierarchical relationships in politics and other organizational settings as well (Moe, 1991) .
From a rational choice perspective, an inherent information asymmetry between principal and agent necessitates a contract in which the principal shifts risk to the agent in order to motivate an efficient level of effort. A principal will not generally be capable of determining whether a given performance outcome (either good or bad) resulted from the agent's effort or from circumstances beyond the agent's control. Only by crafting a compensation scheme that makes agent pay heavily dependent upon the outcome, will the principal be assured that the agent sees high effort as being in her best interest. But because employees are generally far less diversified and less able to bear risk than employers, the use of this type of incentive contract represents an inherent loss of efficiency. The principal will be forced to pay a premium to the employer to make them willing to bear risk that the principal is better able to bear.
In a survey of compensation practices, Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) observed that pay systems in practice actually contained much less variable pay than agency theory predicts.
Studies of salesforce compensation plans (Coughlan & Narasimhan, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989) have also revealed a very substantial fixed pay component that is not consistent with agency theory. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) argued that executive pay plans are moving toward more variable pay and toward greater consistency with agency theory than traditional practices.
Such field tests of agency theory are, however, inherently limited by the absence of experimental control and randomization (Tosi, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 1998 ). Yet experiments on the negotiation of compensation contracts have also documented marked deviations from agency theory predictions. Fehr (2004) summarized a series of experiments on the setting of a flat wage. Principals typically offer a considerably higher than equilibrium wage and in return receive higher than equilibrium levels of effort from agents. In experiments that couple the joint establishment of a wage and an outcome-contingent bonus (Conlon & McLean Parks, 1990 , 1995 Miller & Whitford, 2000) , principals have consistently offered agents high fixed wages and bonuses that are, in theory, insufficient to motivate a high effort from a rational selfinterested agent. Yet the actual agents have responded by providing very high levels of costly effort, leading to levels of efficiency that exceed those possible through the agency theory solutions.
Coupled with the field studies, these experiments indicate that the basic model of rational, self-interested choice underlying agency theory may be fundamentally flawed. Design prescriptions based on a fundamentally flawed model may be misguided or even counterproductive. In this paper we examine an alternative model of human choice which treats social decision making as inherently different from rational individual decision-making under risk or uncertainty. The argument has been made that evolutionary pressure endowed human nature with distinctive cognitive capabilities for facilitating and maintaining social exchange (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Smith, 2003) . Understanding the employment relationship and other types of professional relationships must then be built on a theory not of individual decision but of the capabilities and functioning of this exchange management system. Two experiments were conducted to test these ideas. In experiment 1, subjects made isolated individual decisions about the level of costly resources to invest in a project with a risky outcome. Problem context was varied such that some subjects confronted problems where the costly resource they could invest was called "action," the sure thing level of return was called a "wage," and the variable or risky return was called a "bonus". In experiment 2 we tested agency theory and modular social cognition theory predictions about contract negotiations and effort decisions between an interacting principal and agent.
In the next section we will discuss the theoretical background. We will then describe the predictions, methods, and results of each study. We conclude with a discussion of the findings and implications for future research.
A theory of social exchange
In rational choice theory, the individual makes expected utility maximizing decisions based on a complete and coherent set of preferences over possible states of the world and on beliefs about those states. Ample empirical evidence indicates that this is an inaccurate model of choice; people lack both the inclination and the capacity to make decisions in this way (Camerer, 2003; Selten, 2000; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002) . Cosmides and Tooby (1996) have made a different type of argument -that evolutionary pressure has shaped human nature with dedicated and encapsulated cognitive architecture useful for dealing with specific types of problems. They propose that one such special purpose cognitive system functions to facilitate, track, and manage ongoing social exchange.
They conjecture that such a system would require the capacity to: detect when exchange is offered or is possible, estimate costs and benefits of exchange, estimate likelihoods, choose between alternative offers, detect cheaters, punish cheaters, and track the exchange history with different partners over time. While intuitively plausible, the concept of such exchange modules has been subject to only very limited empirical testing. Cosmides and Tooby were able to demonstrate that logic problems which defy human reasoning are readily solved by virtually everyone when the problem is embedded in the context of detecting violations of the rules of social exchange. This seems very consistent with the idea that cognitive systems for managing social exchange are highly specialized. Moreover the increased facility to solve puzzles does not appear to be a function merely of meaningful content in the exchange context. Other types of meaningful context failed to improve performance levels. So there does appear to be something unique about human capability to reason about social exchange. The modular theory also gives rise to very different choice predictions than does agency theory. We sought to test these differences in the first experiment.
Experimental Design and Predictions
Following Miller and Whitford (2002) , we adapted Dixit and Nalebuff's (1988) illustration of the incentive design problem confronting a software developer hiring a programmer to write code for a new computer game for use in the experiment. In the original version of the problem, a successful project yielded $ 200,000 profit but a failure yielded no profit. With a high effort from the programmer, the probability of success was 80% which dropped to 60% with a low effort. A high effort cost the programmer $ 70,000 but a low effort only $ 50,000. A performance bonus of $ 100,000 would make a risk neutral programmer indifferent between a high and low effort, providing the $ 20,000 expected payment needed to cover the marginal cost of high effort.
Subjects were presented with the agent's problem of deciding whether or not to accept the employment contract and whether or not to give a routine or high effort based on the terms. In the Investment context, no mention was made of an exchange, of a contract or of a counterpart.
Each alternative was described simply as a gamble with different payoffs and probabilities. One element of each alternative was the fixed return component -a sure thing. The second element was a variable component described as a specified probability of a high return and a specified probability of no return. For each pair of gambles, subjects had one of three choices: invest $ 5.00, invest $ 8.50, or do not invest. The size of the investment affected the probability of receiving the high variable return. For a $ 5.00 investment, p = .50 was the chance of receiving the high variable return. For the $ 8.50 investment, p = .80 was the chance of receiving the high variable return.
From the perspective of monetary returns and probabilities, the choice sets in the Exchange condition were identical to those in the Investment condition. However in the Exchange context, these alternatives were described as a series of contract offers made by hypothetical owners. In order to provide stronger cues to activate a putative social exchange module, the owner was given a distinctive name with each contract 1 . Names were randomly assigned to contracts to insure that properties of the name itself did not determine choices. The fixed component of each alternative was described as a flat wage. The variable component was described as a performance bonus contingent on a successful project outcome. The choice between investing $5.00 or $8.50 was described as the provision of low effort on the project or the provision of high effort on the project. The decision not to invest at all in this project was described as electing not to work on the project. Table 1 illustrates contrasting computer screens posing an identical decision differently to subjects in the two conditions. The instructions in the exchange condition emphasized that the owners listed did not actually exist and were used only a means of describing choice scenarios. Owners stood to gain more from a successful project outcome than an unsuccessful project outcome, and as in the other condition, the likelihood of success was 80% with the high effort costing $8.50, 50% with the low effort costing $5.00, and 0% if the subject chose to quit and give no effort.
Problem context should have no impact on choices according to agency theory. Rational utility maximizing requires a focus only on the underlying probability and monetary payoffs which are invariant across problem description. The optimal contract is one that provides the agent with just enough incentive to cover the cost of the high investment/effort. A variable pay (or bonus) of $11.67 provides just this minimum. It gives an expected value of ($11.67)(80%) -($8.50) = $0.84 in the event of high investment and ($11.67)(50%) -($5.00) = $0.84 in the event of low investment. Subjects are not expected to provide high investments (or effort) in contracts that offer variable returns (or Bonus) less than $11.67, regardless of the fixed return (or flat wage). By rational choice, subjects will choose no investment/quit whenever the expected value of an investment is negative.
By the modular cognition theory, the pattern of choices should vary predictably as a function of problem context since the reasoning process is different in the two cases. In the Investment setting, no cues for exchange are provided so cognitive processing should proceed without triggering algorithms associated with an encapsulated social exchange module. In this setting, choices should approximate rational choice. Individuals should choose the high investment if and only if the variable return component exceeds $ 11.67. The size of the fixed return should have no effect on the willingness to make a high investment. Subjects should quit whenever the expected value of the investment is negative.
Processing will be categorically different in the exchange context, which will trigger a different system of reasoning leading to a different set of decisions. Any algorithm sensitive to exchange and the expectation of reciprocation should be sensitive to the size of the fixed wage.
A contract which offers a high fixed component carries with it the status of a "gift" (Akerlof, 1982) since the principal has, without any compensation from the agent, guaranteed the future payment of a fixed sum. Evidence overwhelmingly shows that gifts are universally perceived and felt by their recipients to bring an obligation for reciprocation and repayment (Flynn, 2003; Gouldner, 1962; Mauss, 1947; Rabin, 1994; McCabe & Smith, 2001; Smith, 2003) . In the experiment, the only way for the agent to reciprocate is with high effort. Modular social cognition theory therefore leads to a predicted interaction between problem context and fixed return on agent decisions. In the investment scenario, no cues are provided to activate the exchange algorithms that would create a sense of obligation and the need for repayment. In the exchange scenario, specific cues are provided to do just that.
Methods

Participants
A total of 33 undergraduate students participated in the experiment including 20 males and 13 females. The students ranged in age from 18 to 22 with a median of 19. These participants were recruited through a campus-wide advertisement billed as an opportunity to earn money in return for a one-hour session involving business decision making.
Procedures
All sessions were conducted in the experimental laboratory of a business school at a private midwestern university. Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to a computer terminal and to either the Investment context or the Exchange context. Sessions varied in size from 9-13 participants. Instructions were handed out and after reading through them, each student completed a quiz testing their comprehension of the instructions. Once the quiz was successfully completed, subjects were asked to make a series of decisions regarding 48 separate contracts presented in random sequence at their computer terminal. Table 1 shows the contrasting versions of one such problem as viewed by participants in the two different context conditions.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The instructions informed participants that at the end of the experiment, one of the 48 contracts would be randomly selected and their pay based on the decision they made with respect to that contract. If a contract was randomly selected and the subject had chosen to quit then the participant would earn nothing for the task. If the contract called only for a flat wage of $ 10 then their earnings would be $ 10 less the cost of the level of investment they chose to make. If the contract included a nonzero variable return term then participant compensation would depend on project success. Project success was itself determined at the end of the experiment by random number generation. The odds of success or failure were made contingent on the agent's decision to make either a high or low investment.
Once all subjects completed these decision exercises, though before the outcome was realized, they were offered an additional $10 to complete a questionnaire collecting additional information. Included in this questionnaire were items assessing demographics and risk tolerance. Each participant agreed to complete the questionnaire. One effect of this offer was to insure that even those subjects who invested $8.50 in an unsuccessful project were able to earn a positive return from the experimental session. However they did not know of this opportunity until after they had accepted the risks and made their decisions.
Results
Problem context had a highly significant impact on the agent's decisions regarding effort. Table 2 shows the investment decision frequencies pooled over subjects and contracts as a function of problem context. Decisions to quit or to make a high investment were much more common in the Exchange context. Sixty-four percent of all the low investment decisions were made by participants in the Investment frame context. Those working under the Exchange context were much less likely to choose what could be interpreted as shirking by providing only a low amount of effort toward project success.
[Insert Table 2 about here] Investment levels were coded as 0 = no investment/quit; 1 = low investment/effort; 2 = high investment/effort. Zavoina and McKelvey (1975;  see also Greene, 1997) developed a model for the analysis of ordered categorical response variables. We estimated two such ordered logistic models, predicting participant investment level first as a function of wage and bonus then adding problem context as an additional predictor, coded as 0 = investment context and 1 = exchange context. The second model also included the interaction term between context and the interaction term between bonus and context. Table 3 summarizes the results for these two models. As predicted by agency theory, bonus is a significant predictor of agent effort in both models. Wage is also significant as a predictor. As predicted by modular social cognition theory but not by agency theory, both problem context and the fixed return by context interaction are also significant predictors of an agent's investment decisions.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Discussion
The pattern of results is consistent with the modular social cognition theory of exchange.
Rational choice predicts that variable return should determine investment decisions independent of problem context. Fixed wage could "rationally" influence the decision to quit or provide a low investment. But only a sufficient variable return could "rationally" motivate a high investment.
Choices in the pure investment context without exchange cues generally reflected this agency theory logic.
Yet fixed return also had a significant effect on agent investment when that return was referred to as a wage paid by a hypothetical other person. Interestingly, not just the interaction with wage but also the main effect for framing (context) was significant and negative when entered in model 2. This sign reflected the disproportionate tendency of those in the Exchange context to quit rather than provide a low "effort". Participants in the investment context had little difficulty making a low financial investment if the fixed return was high but the variable return was not promising. Participants in the Exchange context evidently treated the decision to take the contract as a kind of moral obligation to provide full effort, even at a financial cost. Rather than "shirk" to make it financially rewarding, they quit even though this was, in many cases, not an expected value maximizing choice.
The process of reasoning about investment decisions varied considerably when cues were provided that it was a social exchange process with another party. This finding is consistent with Akerlof's (1982) argument that a fixed wage constitutes a kind of gift from the principal, implying an obligation to return high effort. That obligation has motivational force independent of the rationality of risk and return. Models of organization (Jensen, 2001; Salanie, 2000) that do not consider the unique motivational system of reciprocal obligations that underpins social exchange are fundamentally flawed.
While this first study permitted a stark comparison of the processing of information in the two contexts, it did not involve actual exchange between a pair of individuals. Wage contracts were imposed exogenously rather than being determined by the process of exchange between parties. Rather than impose theoretically interesting contracts, experiment two examines the process by which principal and agent work out the terms of employment. It also studies the decision making of the agent that follows from the bargaining process and contract determination.
Study 2: Contract Bargaining and Agent Effort
The game and the experimental context were again a modified version of the game used by Miller & Whitford (2002) . The basic setup followed from Dixit and Nalebuff's (1991) description of the principal-agent problem. It concerned the negotiation of an employment contract between a principal and an agent who would assist in undertaking a risky project. If the pair agreed on contract terms, the agent would make an unobservable decision regarding the effort that he/she would put into the project. A high effort decision increased the odds of project success but also cost the agent more than a low effort decision. The contract negotiations required the determination of a fixed wage level, not contingent on project outcome, and a bonus amount payable only in the event the project succeeded. The dollar figures in the Dixit and Nalebuff problem were modified to fit the dollar payoffs subjects would be able earn from the experiment.
The amount that the principal could realize from a successful project was varied (either $30 or $40). They would receive $10 from a failed project. The only way the owner could undertake the project is through hiring an agent to work on it. The agent could choose to provide either routine effort at a personal cost of $5.00 or high effort at a cost of $8.50. The probability of project success was only 50% with routine effort but rose to 80% with high effort. The optimal contract is one that provides a performance contingent bonus of $11.67 in the event of project success. With this optimal bonus and a zero-wage, rational choice theory predicts that the agent should be willing to put out a high level of effort despite the extra cost.
The manipulation of project size tests the effects of munificence on the formation of incentive contracts and agent effort. In the $30 treatment, it is not possible for the principal to provide the agent with both a flat wage that covers the cost of effort and a sufficiently motivating incentive bonus without the principal ending up with a negative expected return. The source of the efficiency loss predicted by agency theory is the assumption that principals are less risk averse than agents. In order to control for this in our study, we measured risk preferences and assigned subjects who were relatively more risk averse to agent roles, and those less risk averse to principal roles.
Risk preference was measured by presenting each subject with a series of 12 paired choices to estimate the subjects' certainty equivalence for a 50% chance at $100. A similar method was employed by Murnighan, Roth, & Schoumaker (1987) and Bottom, Holloway, McClurg, & Miller (2000) . Subjects who were relatively more risk averse were assigned to agent roles, and those less risk averse were assigned to principal roles. Once subjects were assigned to roles we also indirectly controlled risk preferences through the framing of the instructions. Instructions for the principals stressed that they were negotiating over how much of the $30 of $40 project profit they would keep and how much they would have to give up. Instructions to agents stressed that they were negotiating over how much profit from a zero profit reference point they would earn from their participation in the project. As predicted by the prospect theory value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) , prior research has documented that these asymmetries in negotiator framing do lead to systematic differences in risk preference (Bottom, 1998; Ohtsubo & Kameda, 1998; Schweitzer & DeChurch, 2001 ). Loss framed principals should be relatively more risk seeking than their gain framed counterparts.
The study also included a post-bargaining and agent decision questionnaire which assessed trust in the counterpart and the general affect experienced during the negotiation.
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The trust questions were adapted from the measure of trust in workplace relationships developed by Mayer and Davis (1999) . They created a set of measures of various facets of employee trust in management, which in a private enterprise coincides with ownership. In this experimental setting, many of the facets, such as ability and outcome instrumentality are directly controlled by the design. The agent's ability, for example, is virtually completely determined by the marginal probability of project success given a high as opposed to low effort. Benevolence, the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor, apart from a self-interested motive, is in many respects the crucial measure of the gift exchange logic we sought to test.
The version of the benevolence scale completed by the agents about the principal was essentially the original version of the scale. The principals were given a version that reversed the direction of the relationship. For example, on the Benevolence scale Mayer and Davis ask for agreement with the statement, "Top management will go out of its way to help me". In the principal's version the wording was changed to "The agent will go out of his/her way to help me." The PANAS scale was included in the post-questionnaire to measure general positive and negative affect during the study (Watson et al., 1988) .
Because the negotiations were computer mediated, transcripts of the messages sent by each party were also available for analysis. Three raters, who were blind as to experimental conditions and hypotheses, coded the communications in each dyad for various distinguishing features.
Various attributes of the communications exchanged during the bargaining process were also coded by three raters. These attributes included "discussions of fairness" (0 = fairness of offers were not discussed; 1 = the fairness of offers were discussed), "analytical calculations" (0 = no discussion of expected returns; 1 = explicit discussion of monetary expectations and expected return from contracts), "expressions of trust" (0 = no mention of trusting or trustworthiness; 1 = explicit verbal reference to trusting one's counterpart); "small talk" (0 = no discussions of matters unrelated to the task at hand; 1 = some discussion of personal matters not related to the task).
Predictions
Agency theory predicts that subjects will not provide high effort in contracts that offer a Bonus less than $11.67. The theory predicts that principals will recognize this fact and so create contingent contracts that induce high effort. Bonus will equal or exceed $11.67. Flat wage will equal zero since it provides no incentive and merely redistributes income from the principal to the agent. The model makes no predictions regarding the process by which the pairs reach this understanding. However it seems consistent with the theory that analytic discussions could play an important part in the process of arriving at the optimal incentive contract. In the event that parties fail to find incentive compatible contracts, it may be possible to trace these back to a failure to engage in the proper analysis. We therefore hypothesize that subjects who engage in analytic calculations will craft incentive compatible contracts resulting in high effort. Those who do not do so, may fail to negotiate the proper contract leading to low effort. Modular social cognition theory offers different predictions that should be sensitive to more than the level of bonus. The pairs should achieve higher levels of efficiency whereby the agent receives a high fixed wage and reciprocates with a high level of effort. However the agents' felt obligation to reciprocate is an internal state that mediates the relationship between flat wage and effort level. The nature of the discussion between the parties may also influence the felt obligation independent of the flat wage. Expressions of trust in the other and, in particular, manifestations of friendliness through small talk will also influence the perceived obligation. The model therefore predicts that small talk and a gift of a large flat wage will affect perceptions of a benevolent principal. Perceptions of a benevolent principal will influence effort choices.
The key dependent variable in this study is the agent's choice of either high or low effort.
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In addition, we examine what predicts agent 'voluntary cooperation' -when the principal gives a contract with Bonus less than $11.67, meaning that the agent will maximize expected earnings by giving LOW effort, but the agent in fact gives HIGH effort.
Methods
Participants
A total of 112 undergraduate and graduate students participated in the experiment. The total included 67 males, 45 females. Their age ranged from 17 to 30 with an average of 21.
Participants were recruited through an advertisement that billed the study as an opportunity to earn money in return for participating in the one-hour session.
Procedures
All sessions were conducted in an experimental laboratory located in the Business School of a private midwestern university. Communication between participants took place through a local area network connecting personal computers in the laboratory. From eight to twelve participants comprised each session. The combination of session size and computer mediated communication minimized the opportunity for subjects to learn the identity of their negotiating partner. As an additional check, we also inquired as to prior acquaintance with other participants in the session. Thirty-one percent of the subjects reported never having met any of the other participants who showed up for their particular session. Only 3 % reported knowing two or more of the other participants in their session.
Upon their arrival, the experimenter read aloud to the subjects all of the instructions regarding the game and the method of payment. Participants then took a seat at one of the computer terminals and responded to a series of questions asking for demographic information and for choices between a set of hypothetical gambles and sure payments. The gamble was held constant, a coin toss for $100 or $0. The sure payments varied from $1 to $100 and were designed to assess the subject's certainty equivalent over this range of payments at this point in time. Scores on these items were used to get an index of risk aversion over monetary values in a range similar to those that would be at stake in the experiment. Other studies (Bottom et al., 2000; Murnighan et al., 1988) have used similar assessments and found that they accurately predicted the risk taking behavior in a bargaining game.
Once all the values were calculated, the program sorted participants into more risk tolerant and less risk tolerant groups. The more risk tolerant group were designated principals. The less risk tolerant were designated to be agents. The negotiations began after the program randomly paired a principal and an agent.
The program permitted open-ended communications between owner and agent until both mouse-clicked on a button indicating that they had a verbal agreement as to terms. The owner then was prompted to present a formal contract stipulating a wage amount and a bonus amount. The agent could accept this contract or reject it and terminate the experiment. Both parties understood that if the offer was rejected, then neither party would receive any earnings for the bargaining exercise. If accepted, then the agent was presented with a new screen asking them to decide between a more costly high effort or a less costly low effort.
Subjects then completed a questionnaire regarding perceptions of the bargaining process and their counterpart in the negotiation. The items included the PANAS measure of self-reported affect (Watson et al., 1988) and the Mayer and Davis (1999) benevolence scale.
Randomization of project outcome then proceeded based on the odds associated with the agent's decision. Both agent and owner then learned the outcome of the project. The owner was informed only of the success of the project, not of the agent's decision. Because of the structure of the payoffs, it was conceivable that a participant could in fact sustain a monetary loss if the project failed. Therefore all participants were subsequently given an opportunity to participate in another questionnaire study on an unrelated subject in return for an additional $15 payment.
Participants were not informed of this opportunity for additional payments until after the first experiment had ended.
Results
Three agents rejected the formal contract offered by the principal. Because they chose to quit, earnings for the six participants making up these dyads were limited to the $15 they earned for the unrelated second study. The wage and bonus provisions of these contracts varied considerably. Figure 1 plots the contract terms and agent effort for these dyads with a separate plot based on the size of the project. Table 4 contains descriptive statistics on the key variables.
The average bonus ($11.00) did not differ significantly from the agency theory predicted bonus of $11.67 in either condition. The average fixed wage ($7.11) was significantly greater than the zero wage predicted by agency theory (p<0.001). Two pairs negotiated a zero wage level. Both had incentive bonuses exceeding the $ 11.67 threshold and each resulted in high agent effort.
[ Insert Figure 1 About Here ] Agents provided high effort in 40 of the 54 pairs. The bonus was less than the agency theory prediction in 31 of the 54 pairs. In other words 57% of the high effort contracts lacked a sufficient monetary incentive for the agent to provide that high effort.
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
Predicting Effort
We estimated a series of probit models to examine the factors predicting the agent's decision to invest a high effort in the project. Because the response variable is highly skewed we also estimated the models using complementary log-log regression. The results were similar so only the probit models are reported. Table5 summarizes the model estimates. In Model 1 only the project size and the contract terms were used as predictor variables. Bonus was a significant predictor of agent effort, but the fixed wage was not. The higher the negotiated bonus, the more likely the agent provided high effort. Model 2 added the agent's perception of the owner's benevolence (M = 13.9) as a predictor variable. Benevolence was a significant predictor when added to the contract terms. Agents who reported that they believed the owner was more benevolent were more likely to contribute high effort.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Predicting non-rational or voluntary cooperation
Principals designed 43% of the contracts so that there were clear monetary incentives for the agent to choose high effort over low. In fact 21 of the 23 agents working under a contract with a bonus in excess of $11.67 provided high effort. This provides strong support for the effect of bonus on outcomes, an important part of the agency theory prediction. However, principals designed 57% of the contracts such that agents should actually have chosen a low effort level if they were seeking to maximize their expected payoffs. However, only 12 of these 31 relatively risk-averse agents chose low effort. Nineteen violated agency theory logic.
We examined an additional model to understand the origins of this "voluntary" or "nonrational" cooperation behavior among those not playing a principal agent strategy. Table 6 shows the probit results predicting effort among only this subset of cases. Neither project size nor bonus have a significant effect on the decision to give high effort within this restricted subgroup of contracts. The contractor's perception of the principal's benevolence does predict high effort. A contractor who believes that the owner is interested in his/her welfare was more likely to invest in high effort without the proper monetary incentive to do so.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Predicting Benevolence
Using OLS estimation, we examined a model of the contractor's perception of the owner's benevolence (see Table 7 ). Model 4 includes only the contract terms as predictors. Both flat wage and bonus coefficients were significant. The higher the flat wage he/she was willing to pay, the more benevolent the owner appeared to be to the contractor. Model 5 adds in the level of small talk engaged in by the owner: 0 for none, 1 for some, and 2 for much small talk. The small talk coding was conducted by three raters who made their evaluations by reading through the negotiation transcripts. The addition of the owner small talk variable also improved predictions of the owner's perceived benevolence. The more small talk the owner engaged in, the higher the perceptions of benevolence. Model 6 adds in the self-reported negative affect of both the owner and the contractor. This too improved predictions of the owner's perceived benevolence 4 . The more negative affect experienced by the owner, the less the agent perceived him/her to be benevolent. The more negative affect experienced by the agent, the less the agent perceived the owner to be benevolent. Negative affect is commonly the product of feelings of inequity or unfair treatment in social exchange (Adams, 1965; Barry & Oliver, 1996; Witvliet, Ludwig, & Vander Laan, 2001 ).
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Discussion
In one very important sense, the results of Study 2 are completely consistent with agency theory. When provided with a sufficiently motivating incentive bonus, agents in experiment 2 consistently provided a high level of effort. Because of the relatively greater risk aversion of the principal in these dyads, they did so at the cost to efficiency hypothesized by agency theory.
However the results are also consistent with prior survey, field, and experimental evidence that is itself inconsistent with agency theory. The great majority of pairs negotiated a contract that was not of the agency theory form. These contracts had much smaller incentive bonuses and significant fixed wages. In direct contradiction to one of agency theory's predictions, most of the agents working under these types of contracts also responded with high effort. These pairs achieved higher levels of efficiency than agency theory suggests is possible.
It appears that there are two pathways to motivating an agent to provide high effort. One approach, consistent with agency theory is to provide a sufficiently high level of incentive bonus.
This aligns the monetary incentives of the agent with those of the principal and generally led to a high effort decision in this experiment. Consistent with the theory this constitutes a "secondbest" solution because of the inherent inefficiency involved in shifting risk onto the party least prepared to bear it.
A second and quite different approach was taken by many of the participants in this experiment. They failed to negotiate a bonus that provided a sufficient monetary incentive for high effort by agents. Yet by securing high agent effort they also attained a level of efficiency exceeding the "second best" of agency theory. This second pathway relied on small talk and the fixed wage to generate a perception on the part of the agent that the principal was benevolent. By the robust and universal principle of reciprocity, an agent owes a debt that must be repaid to a benevolent principal. Agents responded by paying the price of high effort despite the lack of a monetary incentive.
Prior empirical tests of the modular theory of social cognition have been limited to study the facility of logical problem solving on the Wason selection task. Taken together, the two experiments reported here provide broader empirical support for the modular theory. People reason quite differently about social exchange relations than they do about risky decisions with individual consequences. The limitations of the agency theory model reflect a failure to account for the very particular architecture and operation of this exchange system. Experimental subjects appear to have a good understanding of this aspect of human nature. The risk sharing solution embodied in agency theory works, but not as efficiently as the relational approach embodied in gift exchange and in most of the employment contracts negotiated by subjects. The failure of business organizations to adopt pay practices consistent with agency theory (Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 1988; Coughlan & Narasimhan, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989) may reflect their keener understanding that there is another pathway to motivating high effort. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) suggest that executive compensation practices may be trending toward greater consistency with agency theory logic. If true, it is quite possible that organizations may be sacrificing the higher levels of efficiency possible from the second pathway through trust and goodwill. While Theory X and Theory Y are old ideas (McGregor, 1960) , much more research is still needed to fully understand all the tradeoffs between these two alternative means to motivation. Probit Estimate ** Indicates that the coefficient is significant at better than 0.01 * Indicates that the coefficient is significant at better than 0.05 for one-tailed tests Note: For all statistical models Huber-White standard errors Probit Estimate ** Indicates that the coefficient is significant at better than 0.01 * Indicates that the coefficient is significant at better than 0.05 for one-tailed tests OLS Regression ** Indicates that the coefficient is significant at better than 0.01 * Indicates that the coefficient is significant at better than 0.05 for one-tailed tests † Indicates that the coefficient is significant at better than 0.10 3 Note that Small Talk and Contract's Negative Affect are highly correlated (-0.368**) and test have confirmed multicollinearity . 
